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I. INTRODUCING THE PROBLEM:
THE "WARSAW SYSTEM"O ne of the most controversial and publicly debated issues
among the international aviation community is that of air
carrier liability arising from international, private aviation disas-
ters. Air carrier liability in such incidents is governed by a
number of international legal instruments collectively known as
the "Warsaw System."' Given that its basic component, the War-
saw Convention of 1929,2 was enacted almost seven decades
ago, certain concepts are now seen as unfair to air travelers and
unresponsive to the needs of both the disaster victims and the
aviation industry alike due to the unrealistic, antiquated systems
of compensation.
The Warsaw System, as a uniform liability regime, severely lim-
its the ability of a passenger, or the surviving family, to recover
damages resulting from injury or death aboard an international
flight.' It does so by requiring the establishment of willful mis-
t "Warsaw System" refers to the Warsaw Convention of 1929 and related inter-
national legal instruments, including, inter alia, the Hague Protocol of 1955 and
the Montreal Interim Agreement of 1966. See Bin Cheng, A New-Look Warsaw
Convention on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century, 22 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 45
(1997).
2 See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, apened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11,
reprinted in 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1988) (hereinafter Warsaw Convention]. Hav-
ing been ratified by 127 countries, it could be said that the Warsaw Convention is
the world's most successful international treaty. See H. Caplan, Modernizing the
Warsaw System: A Protocol on New Convention, AVIATION Q., Oct. 1996, at 138.
The disparity between damage awards for international and domestic crashes
is a good indication of the effects of the limitations. See HenryJ. Reske, Putting a
Price on Life, 83 A.B.A. J. 23 (1997). One study concluded that wrongful death
claimants in international aviation disasters recovered on average U.S. $200,000
in cases settled before trial and U.S. $330,000 in cases that went to trial. In con-
trast, average recoveries for domestic claimants arising from flights that both de-
part from and arrive in the United States, where no liability limitation is
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conduct on the part of the airline in order to escape certain
caps placed on air carrier liability.'
The Warsaw Convention of 1929 originally set a cap on air
carrier liability for passenger injury or death at approximately
U.S. $8300. In 1955 dissatisfaction with this liability limit and
the absence of a mechanism in the Convention to increase the
limits relative to inflation led several nations to ratify the Hague
Protocol,6 an amendment to the Warsaw Convention that
doubled the damage cap in incidents governed by such to ap-
proximately U.S. $16,600. 7 Depending on which legal instru-
ment governs the accident, the original liability cap or the
liability cap as modified by the Hague Protocol still applies un-
less the applicable carrier is subject to the Montreal Interim
Agreement of 1966; a contractual agreement between the
United States and airlines serving the United States raising the
limit to U.S. $75,000.8
While claimants would like to see the elimination of the ex-
tremely low damage limits, both airlines and claimants would
very much like to see the elimination of the time and cost associ-
ated with litigating international aviation disaster claims as well. 9
Because claimants invariably seek to escape the liability limita-
tions by attempting to prove that an air carrier's "willful miscon-
applicable, were U.S. $480,000 and U.S. $730,000 respectively. See id. at 23 (Paul
Stephen Dempsey, director of the Transportation Law Program at the University
of Denver College of Law, citing a 1990 U.S. General Accounting Office study).
4 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 25(1).
5 Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 22(1).
6 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to International Carriage by Air, opened for signature Sept. 28, 1955, 478
U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter Hague Protocol] reprinted in LAWRENCE B. GOLDHIRSCH,
THE WARSAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED: A LEGAL HANDBOOK 265 (1988).
7 See Committee Approves Draft Convention for Modernization of Warsaw System,
ICAO J., May 1997, at 27 [hereinafter Committee Approves Draft Convention).
8 Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of Warsaw Convention and
Hague Protocol, May 13, 1966, 14 C.F.R. § 203 (1996) [hereinafter Montreal In-
terim Agreement], reprinted in LAWRENCE B. GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVEN-
TION ANNOTATED: A LEGAL HANDBOOK 317 (1988).
9 For example, the lengthy litigation arising from the 1988 bombing and sub-
sequent crash of Pan Am flight 103 in Lockerbie, Scotland, shows how difficult it
is to overcome the antiquated liability ceiling and how much time and cost is
associated with asserting and defending such a claim. See Reske, supra note 3, at
23. "In the Lockerbie case, some 225 passenger claims were consolidated ....
The case produced 22,000 pages of depositions, 10,000 pages of exhibits, and an
8000-page trial record. After a three-month jury trial, willful misconduct was
found." Id. (quoting Paul Stephen Dempsey, director of the Transportation Law
Program at the University of Denver College of Law).
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duct" caused the injury or death, lengthy and therefore costly
litigation inevitably results, but it fails to yield compensation
commensurate with amounts necessary to sufficiently make
either an injured passenger or her surviving family whole."'
As a result of continued dissatisfaction with the Warsaw Sys-
tem, domestic and international carriers took independent ac-
tion in 1996 to adopt the International Air Transport
Association (IATA) Intercarrier Agreement." The Intercarrier
Agreement requires carriers to "voluntarily" waive the Warsaw
Convention's liability cap and the application of strict liability
principles to claims as high as approximately U.S. $135,000.12 In
addition, the initiative could conceivably allow recovery of dam-
ages above the threshold without proof of air carrier willful mis-
conduct if the air carrier fails to prove it was free of fault.' 3 The
Intercarrier Agreement is a laudable attempt to rectify the
problems of the Warsaw System, especially in light of the fact
that most of the major airlines of the world have effectively
waived the limitations of liability available to them under the
Warsaw Convention. However, the manner in which the IATA
Intercarrier Agreement came about leaves the legal conse-
quences of the agreement far from clear. Because it is, by its
nature, a contract and not legislation, it must be viewed, at most,
as an interim solution."
Despite the tremendous and often horrific significance that
the Warsaw System, as amended, modified, and supplemented,
has on private air carrier liability, it is safe to say that the major-
ity of the public around the world are oblivious to its impact
until a disaster hits close to home.' 5 Yet, tragedies such as the
10 See Susan Carey & Leslie Scism, Airlines: Old Liability Limits May Not Apply in
TWA Crash, WALL ST. J., July 24, 1996, at BI (reporting on increased cost and
delay resulting from claimants attempting to prove willful misconduct in order to
avoid the liability limitations under the Warsaw System).
11 International Air Transport Association, Intercarrier Agreement on Passen-
ger Liability, opened for signature Oct. 31, 1995 (on file with author).
12 "IATA Intercarrier Agreement" is actually the collective name of three
agreements. See discussion of the International Air Transport Association Inter-
carrier Agreement, infra Part IV.
13 See id.
14 See id.
15 This truth remains notwithstanding the fact that air carriers are required
under the Warsaw Convention to give notice to travelers by inserting the Conven-
tion's liability provisions in their tickets. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2,
art. 3(1).
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shooting down of Korean Airlines Flight KAL 007 in 1983,6 the
1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland,
the 1995 American Airlines crash in Cali, Columbia, and the
1996 explosion of TWA Flight 800 off Long Island, New York, to
name a few, have increased awareness of international air car-
rier liability under the outdated Warsaw System, and specifically
the resulting paltry damage awards.1 7 As a result of the height-
ened awareness and notwithstanding the most recent self-regula-
tory efforts of air carriers, the governments, air travelers, and air
carriers of the world are demanding, more than ever, an urgent
overhaul of the system. Historically, previous attempts have re-
sulted in a loose bundle of international treaties and contractual
agreements endangering the viability of the uniform global legal
framework initially sought by the drafters of the Warsaw Con-
vention. The "uniform" Warsaw System now varies by country
and by carrier, because countries have adopted different legal
instruments and the Warsaw Convention in its original form has
left carriers free to accept higher limits of liability by special
contract.
Thus, to finally fulfill the initial goal of uniformity and to
modernize international air carrier liability, the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)' Legal Committee has
drafted a new international treaty to completely replace the anti-
quated Warsaw Convention. Once adopted and ratified, the
Draft Convention will likely serve as a permanent answer to a
16 The cases arising from KAL 007 are a good illustration of the unacceptable
length of time associated with litigating claims stemming from aviation tragedies,
attributed, for the most part, to the shortcomings of the present liability regime
under the Warsaw System. See Ludwig Weber & Arie Jakob, Draft Convention Seeks
to Consolidate and Modernize the Elements of the Warsaw System, ICAOJ., Oct. 1997, at
5 [hereinafter Weber & Jakob, Draft Convention]. For instance, several of the
cases involving victim's families' suits against Korean Airlines are still pending in
1998, almost 15 years after the tragedy, with the most recent resolution of one of
the cases being decided in September 1997. See id.; Oldham v. Korean Air Lines
Co., 127 F.3d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
17 See Carey & Scism, supra note 10, at B1.
18 The ICAO, created in 1944 to promote the safe and orderly development of
civil aviation worldwide, is the specialized United Nations agency for civil aviation
that administers the Warsaw Convention and related treaties. See 1 STUART M.
SPEISER & CHARLES F. KRAUSE, AVIATION TORT L. § 11:4, at 631-33 (1978 & Supp.
1997) [hereinafter 1 SPEISER & KRAUSE]. Headquartered in Montreal, ICAO de-
velops international air transport standards and regulations and serves as the me-
dium of cooperation in all fields of civil aviation among its 185 Contracting
States. See Promoting the Development of International Civil Aviation, ICAO J., Oct.
1997, at 30.
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seventy-year old problem. 9 The Draft Convention essentially
provides for a two-tiered liability system based upon strict liabil-
ity up to approximately U.S. $135,000 and unlimited fault-based
liability beyond that limit. 2" Although similar in effect to the
IATA Intercarrier Agreement, the Draft Convention would be
law, not merely a contract. In addition, certain provisions of the
Draft Convention, such as an "Updating Clause," which provides
for periodic adjustments of the liability limitations, go far be-
yond that endeavored by the IATA.
The purpose of this Comment is to introduce the ICAO's
draft of this landmark treaty and to discuss how it proposes to
modernize and consolidate the Warsaw System.2' The primary
focus will be on the attempt to eliminate the artificially low lim-
its placed on private air carrier liability in cases of international
aviation disasters that result in personal injury or death to pas-
sengers. However, in order to fully consider the Draft Conven-
tion in context, it is necessary to discuss the evolution of air
carrier liability under the Warsaw System. Thus, this Comment
will first introduce the Warsaw System and trace certain of the
more significant international community efforts to expand the
liability provisions of the Warsaw Convention, both successful
and unsucessful, including the IATA Intercarrier Agreement of
1996.
II. THE WARSAW CONVENTION OF 1929
A. UNIFORM PROCEDURES AND LIABIL rv
The Warsaw Convention, ratified by the United States in 1934,
is a multilateral treaty that governs private air carrier liability
9 See discussion of the ICAO Draft Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules for International Carriage by Air of 1997, infra Part V.
2 ) See Ludwig Weber & Arie Jakob, Current Developments Concerning the Reform of
the Warsaw Convention, 21 ANNALS AIR & SPACe; L. 303, 312 (1996) [hereinafter
Weber & Jakob, Current Developments].
21 The Draft Convention, before afforded an opportunity to be ratified individ-
ually by any country, must first be presented to, and formally adopted by, the 185
ICAO contracting or signatory nations at a Diplomatic Conference called by the
Council of the ICAO. See ICAO, News Releases, Draft Convention for the Moderniza-
tion of the Warsaw System of Air Carrier Liability Approved (visited May 14, 1997)
<http://www.cam.org/-icao/>. Because the thirty-second session of the ICAO
Assembly will be held in the autumn of 1998, the Diplomatic Conference on the
Draft Convention will not take place in 1998. The Council of the ICAO, though,
will consider the subject of such a Diplomatic Conference in its session in June
1998 where it will decide on its timing, likely to be in 1999.
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stemming from international air transportation 22 and that com-
mits its signatories to mutual obligations under each signatory's
respective legal system. 23 The conference at Warsaw in 1929 had
two primary goals. First, it attempted to establish a certain de-
gree of uniformity in documentation, such as tickets and air way-
bills, and in procedures governing liability arising out of
international, private aviation transportation.2 4 Second, and
more important at the time, the conference sought to establish
a uniform system of strict but limited liability for air carriers in
the event of international accidents 25 involving passenger 26 in-
22 The Warsaw Convention applies "to all international transportation of per-
sons, baggage, or goods performed by aircraft for hire." Warsaw Convention,
supra note 2, art. 1 (1). "International transportation" is defined by the Conven-
tion as
any transportation in which, according to the contract made by the
parties, the place of departure and the place of destination,
whether or not there be a break in the transportation or a trans-
shipment, are situated either within the territories of two High
Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High Con-
tracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory
subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of an-
other power, even though that power is not a party to this
convention.
Id. art. 1(2). In the United States, a High Contracting Party is a signatory nation
which has ratified the Warsaw Convention. See 1 SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 18,
§ 11:13, at 661.
23 See GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 8, at 3-4. For a list of the countries that are
parties or signatories to the Warsaw Convention, see 1 LEE S. KREINDLER, AVIA-
TION ACCIDENT L. § 11.01 [3], at 11-7 (1988) [hereinafter 1 KREINDLER]. For a list
of the 185 Contracting States of the ICAO, see any recent publication of the
ICAO Journal. See, e.g., Promoting the Development of International Civil Aviation,
ICAO J., Oct. 1997, at 30.
24 See 1 SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 18, § 11:4, at 635-36; Frances K. Davis &
Ann Thornton Field, Can the Legal Eagles Use the Ageless Preemption Doctrine to Ameri-
can Aviators Soaring Above the Clouds and into the Twenty-First Century?, 62J. AIR L. &
COM. 315, 368 (1996). The Warsaw Convention also determines the rules on
which courts have jurisdiction. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 28(1).
25 In order for the limitations under the Warsaw Convention to be triggered,
an "accident" must have been the cause of the passenger's death or injury while
on board or "embarking or disembarking," otherwise the claimant can escape the
limitations by proving negligence. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 17.
An "accident" occurs only when external, unexpected events kill or injure the
passenger. See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985) (holding deafness of pas-
senger caused by normal aircraft pressurization not an accident). In order to
determine if a passenger is "embarking or disembarking," one court has em-
ployed a three-part test that considers, at the time of the accident, the passenger's
activities, the distance between the aircraft and the passenger, and the extent of
control over which the air carrier had on the passenger. See Day v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976).
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jury or death. 2' The damage limitations, however, were set only
as a quid pro quo for a placement of limitations on the air car-
rier's defenses, as well as the presumption of fault on the air
carrier. 28 The Convention did not purport to afford complete
coverage for casualty losses, yet mainly intended to extend nec-
essary protection to a still-developing, infant aviation industry.29
B. AIR CARRIER LIABILITY
Nonetheless, the Warsaw Convention establishes a presump-
tion that air carriers are liable for damages sustained by its pas-
26 Status as a passenger is a prerequisite to recover damages under the Warsaw
Convention. A passenger is one who has either paid for his transportation on the
aircraft or is transported gratuitously. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, arts.
1(1), 17. Passengers under the Warsaw Convention do not include those travel-
ing in the course of employment on their employer's aircraft. See, e.g., Sulcwski v.
Federal Express Corp., 933 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1991) (aircraft mechanic who was
traveling at time of his death in plane crash was not traveling as "passenger" for
purposes of liability under Warsaw Convention, so worker's compensation was
exclusive remedy available for mechanic's death); In re Mexico City Aircrash of
Oct. 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1983) (two flight attendants working aboard
airplane that crashed were not "passengers" within meaning of Warsaw Conven-
tion and therefore representatives precluded from bringing wrongful death ac-
tion under Convention).
27 The Warsaw Convention procedures and limitations on liability also were
intended and are applicable for any claims arising out of damaged cargo and
baggage, yet for our purposes discussion will be dedicated to claims of personal
injury and death. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 1.
28 See 1 SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 18, § 11:4, at 636; Andreas F. Lowenfeld
& Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L.
lREv. 497, 498-99 (1967).
2q See 1 KREINDLER, supra note 23, § 11.01 [6], at 11-13. At that time the air
carrier industry was weak financially, and it was thought necessary to protect air
carriers from going bankrupt as a result of a single disaster. See id. Moreover,
without limits, it was thought insurance would be too expensive for carriers to
obtain, or in the alternative that tickets would be too expensive for passengers to
purchase because the cost of such would inevitably be inflated commensurate
with any rise in an air carrier's insurance costs. See id. In other words, the draft-
ers sought to enable the aviation industry to obtain the necessary capital for fu-
ture growth by providing a definite basis for insurance rates and reducing
operating expenses with subsequent savings to the airline industry and its passen-
gers. See 1 SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 18, § 11:4, at 332. In addition, systematic
procedures for handling international aviation claims were also sought to help
simplify the complications associated with the use of different languages and cus-
toms. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 28, at 498-99. Although the goals
and considerations of the original drafters of the Warsaw Convention were then
necessary, it surely could be said that the original policy of the Convention has
lost a great deal of its persuasive force given that international air travel is no
longer an infant industry.
1998] THE WARSAW CONVENTION REVISITED
sengers,3 ° yet allow the carrier to escape liability upon the
carrier's establishment of a "due care defense," if it can prove
that all necessary measures were taken to avoid the damage or
that it was impossible for the carrier to take such measures to
prevent the damage as defined under the Warsaw Convention.31
Similarly, if an air carrier establishes that a passenger's own ac-
tions contributed to his injury or death, the forum court's law
on contributory or comparative negligence will apply to reduce
the extent which the air carrier is liable. 2
However, the most significant and subsequently controversial
provision of the Convention is found in Article 22(1), which
strictly limits liability or potential damages to 125,000 francs, the
equivalent of U.S. $8300,11 absent the plaintiff being able to suc-
cessfully prove that the carrier was guilty of "willful misconduct,"
a question for the fact-finder. 4 Thus, under the original War-
30 This, of course, is a reversal of the traditional burden of proof. See Warsaw
Convention, supra note 2, art. 17. Article 17 expressly provides that
Et]he carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suf-
fered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so
sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of
the operations of embarking or disembarking.
Id.
31 Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 20(1). Article 20 expressly provides
that "[t]he carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents have
taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for
him or them to take such measures." Id.
32 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 21. Article 21 expressly provides
that "[i]f the carrier proves that the damage was caused by or contributed to by
the negligence of the injured person the court may, in accordance with the provi-
sions of its own law, exonerate the carrier wholly or partly from his liability." Id.
33 Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 22(1). Article 22(1) expressly pro-
vides that
[i] n the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for
each passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs.
Where, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is
submitted, damages may be awarded in the form of periodical pay-
ments, the equivalent capital value of the said payments shall not
exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special contract, the car-
rier and passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability.
Id. It should be noted that at the time the United States ratified the Warsaw
Convention in 1934 that amount was approximately U.S. $10,000. See Desmond
T. Barry, Jr. & ThomasJ. Whalen, Unlimited Liability: The New Ball Game in Interna-
tional Transportation by Air, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 381 (1997).
34 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 25(1). Article 25(1) expressly pro-
vides that
[t]he carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions
of this convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage
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saw System, assuming that the air carrier could not establish a
"due care defense," a passenger injured or killed on an interna-
tional flight would be entitled, upon proof of damages, to only a
minimal recovery leaving either the injured or his surviving fam-
ily inadequately compensated for the value of loss sustained in
most cases. 5
Notwithstanding the damage recovery limit, air carriers can
contract with passengers to pay a higher amount of damages.36
However, an air carrier is prohibited from contracting to reduce
the amount of damages to be paid in the event of injury or
death resulting from an international flight.3 7
is caused by his willful misconduct or by such default on his part as,
in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is submit-
ted, is considered to be equivalent to willful misconduct.
Id. The air carrier also loses the benefit of the liability limitation if one of its
agents, while acting in the scope of his employment, engages in willful miscon-
duct. See id. art. 25(2). However, the Warsaw Convention itself does not define
willful misconduct. See id. Because of the failure of Article 25 to specify what
constitutes willful misconduct, the findings in willful misconduct cases vary ac-
cording to the law of the court in which a passenger files a complaint against an
air carrier and in turn have resulted in a disparity of findings. See Eloise
Cotugno, No Rescue in Sight for Warsaw Plaintiffs from Either Courts or Legislature-
Montreal Protocol 3 Drowns in Committee, 58J. AIR L. & COM. 745, 773 (1993).
In defining "willful misconduct," U.S. courts do not typically require intent to do
harm as an element to be proven in air crash cases, they do typically require
"knowledge that one's actions likely will result in death or a conscious or reckless
disregard for that probability." John Gibeaut, An Airline Limitation Device Used in
the Unlikely Event of 'Water Landings, 'Laws Cap Recovery, 82 A.B.A. J. 34 (1996); see
I KREINDLER, supra note 23, § 10:05[4], at 10-80 (intent to do harm not an ele-
ment of willful misconduct); In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scot. of Dec. 21,
1988, 37 F.3d 804, 812 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating "[w]illful misconduct means that a
carrier must have acted either with knowledge that its actions would probably
result in injury or death, or in conscious or reckless disregard of the fact that
death or injury would be the probable consequence of its actions"). In compari-
son, the U.S. Department of Transportation has defined "willful misconduct" in
this context as an "extreme form of gross negligence." See Reske, supra note 3, at
23.
35, See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, arts. 20, 22.
31i See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 22(1). Article 22 expressly pro-
vides that by "special contract, the carrier and passenger may agree to a higher
limit of liability." Id.
37 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 23. Article 23 expressly provides
that
[a] ny provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability or to fix a
lower limit than that which is laid down in this convention shall be
null and void, but the nullity of any such provision shall not involve
the nullity of the whole contract, which shall remain subject to the
provisions of this convention.
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C. JURISDICTION
The Warsaw Convention not only curtails the amount and
kind of damages recoverable, but also the jurisdictional fora for
filing claims against air carriers. The jurisdictional fora are lim-
ited to the country of the air carrier's domicile, the country of
the air carrier's principal place of business, the country in which
the contract for air travel was made, or the country of the pas-
senger's destination or final stop, regardless of whether the pas-
senger traveled on more than one airline. 8 Unlike the liability
provisions, the provisions governing jurisdiction cannot be al-
tered by "special contract" between the air carrier and the
passenger. 9
III. EARLY MODIFICATIONS OF THE WARSAW
CONVENTION
The Warsaw Convention represented a major achievement in
the unification of international private aviation law in 1929. Ab-
sent the introduction of the uniform rules on liability, the devel-
opment of the private aviation industry would have been
severely hampered given the unpredictability common with
complex conflicts of law likely to have arisen, which would have
in turn precluded airlines from being insured against the risks
that would have resulted. However, almost immediately after it
went into effect, the Warsaw Convention provoked sharp debate
and criticism in the United States and throughout the world. °
Because the Warsaw Convention does not contain any mecha-
nisms to increase the limits of liability relative to inflation and
38 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 28(1). Article 28(1) expressly pro-
vides that
[a]n action for damages must be brought, at the option of the
plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his prin-
cipal place of business, or where he has a place of business through
which the contract has been made, or before the court at the place
of destination.
Id.
39 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 32. Article 32 expressly provides
that
[a]ny clause contained in the contract and all special agreements
entered into before the damage occurred by which the parties pur-
port to infringe the rules laid down by this convention, whether by
deciding the law to be applied, or by altering the rules as tojurisdic-
tion, shall be null and void.
Id.
'o See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 28, at 502.
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other factors, the passage of time invariably has necessitated ad-
justments to the liability regime in order to be responsive to
changing demands for compensation associated with increases
in real income and the rising cost of living.
A. HAGUE PROTOCOL OF 1955
It was not until 1955 and the Hague Protocol that the first
substantial effort was made to modify the original legal frame-
work of the Warsaw System." In principal effect the Hague Pro-
tocol doubled the Warsaw Convention's limit of recovery for
passengers, or their surviving families, to approximately U.S.
$16,600 in cases of personal injury or death. 2 However, some
nations, the United States in particular, did not ratify or adhere
to the protoco" 3 and continued to express dissatisfaction with
the limit of liability even as modified at the Hague."
B. MONTREAL INTERIM AGREEMENT OF 1966
Notwithstanding its dissatisfaction with the Warsaw System,
the United States did ultimately agree to participate in the Mon-
treal Agreement of 1966.1' At Montreal, international air carri-
ers that travel to, from, or throughout the United States
voluntarily agreed to: (1) raise the limit of absolute liability to
U.S. $75,000; (2) waive the "due care defense" or carrier proof
41 Hague Protocol, supra note 6.
42 Hague Protocol, supra note 6, art. XI. In addition, the Hague Protocol al-
lowed courts to award passengers litigation expenses according to the law of the
applicable forum. See id.
43 Notably, in 1965 the United States was on the verge, ten years after Hague,
of denouncing the Warsaw System altogether because of the still extremely low
liability cap. See GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 8, at 7. Thus, the original liability limit
of U.S. $8300 remained applicable in the United States. See id.
44 See id. Opponents of the Hague Protocol argued that the international avia-
tion industry was well established and no longer financially weak so as to require
the protection of special liability limitations. See David I. Sheinfeld, From Warsaw
to Tenerife: A Chronological Analysis of the Liability Limitations Imposed Pursuant to the
Warsaw Convention, 45 J. AIR. L. & COM. 653, 660 (1980). Over time, over 100
countries became parties to the Hague Protocol. See 1 KRENIDLER, supra note 23,
§ 11:03[04], at 11-11.
45 Montreal Interim Agreement, supra note 8. The agreement in Montreal was
intended to be an "interim solution" to the Warsaw System, hence the name
Montreal Interim Agreement. However, it is interesting to note that it lasted over
thirty years. For a detailed discussion of the Montreal Interim Agreement and
the events leading up to it, see Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 28 (article
authors represented the United States State Department at Montreal).
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of non-negligence4 6 regarding the U.S. $75,000 limit; (3) pro-
vide passengers with a warning regarding the applicability of the
Warsaw system, as modified by the Montreal Interim Agree-
ment; and (4) allow passengers to retain the option of establish-
ing "willful misconduct" on the part of the carrier in order to
get unlimited damages.47
Unlike the Warsaw Convention, or Hague Protocol, the Mon-
treal Interim Agreement is not a treaty or amendment thereto,
but rather is a "special contract," allowed by Article 22 of the
Warsaw Convention, between international carriers who signed
the agreement and passengers with tickets having points of de-
parture, destination, or agreed stopping places in the United
States. 48  Due to its contractual nature, the Montreal Interim
Agreement imposed a quasi-legal and experimental system of li-
ability and does not amend the provisions of the Warsaw Con-
vention or the Hague Protocol.49
After the Montreal Interim Agreement and before the IATA
Intercarrier Agreement of 1996,50 thirty years passed before
there was an attempt to modify the Warsaw Convention's dam-
age limitations. Thus, with respect to international transporta-
tion to, from, or through the United States, such limitations
have not been altered since.51 Consequently, a passenger on a
46 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 20(1). The waiver thereby allows
the plaintiff the presumptive right to compensation for damages up to U.S.
$75,000 upon simple proof of damages. See id.
47 Pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 203 (1996), all carriers operating to and from the
United States are deemed to be parties to the Montreal Interim Agreement;
thus, the applicable limit to and from the United States is currently U.S. $75,000.
See Dep't of Transp., International Air Transport Association: Agreement Relat-
ing to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention; Air Transport Association
of America: Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Conven-
tion, Order No. 97-1-2, at 2 n.2 (Jan. 8, 1997), available in WESTLAW Ftran-dot
Database [hereinafter DOT Reconsideration Order].
48 See GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 8, at 7. The Montreal Interim Agreement, just
as the IATA Intercarrier Agreement, can be deemed a mechanism of "special
contract" of which Article 22(1) of the Warsaw Convention expressly allows to
effect a higher limit of liability. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
49 See 1 KREINDLER, supra note 23, § 12:03[04], at 12-7.
50 See discussion of the IATA Intercarrier Agreement, infra Part IV.
51 Not to say that there has not been attempts in the interim. For instance,
because the United States viewed the Montreal Interim Agreement as a tempo-
rary, non-governmental solution, it, along with twenty other countries signed and
adopted the Guatemala Protocol of 1971. Protocol to Amend the Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed
at Warsaw on Oct. 12, 1929, as Amended by the Protocol Done at the Hague on
Sept. 28, 1955, done Mar. 8, 1971, ICAO Doc. No. 8932 (1971) [hereinafter Gua-
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flight that has a place of departure, agreed destination, or
agreed stopping place in the United States has two options: (1)
prove actual damages up to U.S. $75,000 without establishing a
liability case against the carrier, or (2) attempt to prove that the
carrier engaged in "willful misconduct"52 in hopes of gaining
temala Protocol], reprinted in GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 8, at 319; see also I SPEISER
& KRAUSE, supra note 18, § 11:20, at 680. Some of the main provisions of the
Guatemala Protocol of 1971 included: (1) increasing the Warsaw Convention's
liability limits for passenger death or injury to the approximate equivalent of U.S.
$100,000 exclusive of legal fees and costs; (2) periodic adjustment of the liability
limit; (3) application of strict liability, i.e., absolute or not dependent on fault, in
the case of personal injury or death, but with the quid pro quo that the damage
limitation could not be transgressed in cases of willful misconduct; (4) supple-
mental national insurance plans or compensation systems to further protect pas-
sengers; and (5) a settlement inducement clause where legal fees could be
awarded passengers if an air carrier refused to settle within a six-month period
after being notified in writing of a settlement amount. See Guatemala Protocol,
supra, arts. II, III, VI, VII, VIII, X, X1V, XV. Nevertheless, the Guatemala Protocol
is not in force anywhere in the world because of an insufficient number of ratify-
ing countries. See LudwigJ. Weber & Arie Jakob, ICAO Taking Initiative to Reform
the Legal Framework for Air Carrier Liability, ICAO J., Apr. 1996, at 22 [hereinafter
Weber &Jakob, ICAO Taking Initiative]. The United States never even submitted
the Guatemala Protocol to the Senate for ratification because its provisions
linked liability limits to the fluctuating price of gold. See Nicolas M. Matte, The
Warsaw System and the Hesitations of the U.S. Senate, 8 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 151,
158 (1983).
Of similar consequence are the four Additional Montreal Protocols of 1975. See
Additional Protocols Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 to Amend the Convention for the Unifi-
cation of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at War-
saw on Oct. 12, 1929, Sept. 25, 1975 [hereinafter Montreal Protocols], reprinted
in GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 8, at 331-62. The main purpose of Montreal Proto-
cols Nos. 1-3, collectively, were to replace the denomination of the liability limits
expressed in gold francs in the different Warsaw instruments with SDR, the IMF
unit of account. See Weber & Jakob, ICAO Taking Initiative, supra, at 22. Yet,
Montreal Protocol No. 3 also sought to fully incorporate the Guatemala Protocol
of 1971 into a new instrument that would apply independently of the original.
See id. Montreal Protocol No. 4, not particularly relevant to our discussion, fur-
ther sought to align air carrier liability for the carriage of cargo with that estab-
lished for the carriage of passengers and baggage by introducing the concept of
strict liability. See id. At any rate, the Montreal Protocols have thus far suffered
the same fate as the Guatemala Protocol because none have been ratified by a
sufficient number of countries. See id.
52 Although the burden typically is too great to overcome, U.S. courts have
found willful misconduct in some cases. See In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scot.
of Dec. 21, 1988, 37 F.3d 804, 819 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding carrier guilty of willful
misconduct when risk of a bomb, hidden inside a radio packed in baggage, was
well known to the aviation industry at the time, and personnel repeatedly ignored
warnings indicating security measures were deficient); In re Korean Air Lines Dis-
aster of Sept. 1, 1983, 932 F.2d 1475, 1479-84 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994
(1991) (holding air carrier, which was shot down after flying into Soviet airspace,
guilty of willful misconduct in light of evidence of previous errors in program-
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unlimited damages. Outside the United States, the liability pro-
visions of the Warsaw Convention, or the Convention as
amended by the Hague Protocol if applicable, remain in effect.
Because injured passengers or their surviving families often be-
lieve that even the Montreal Interim Agreement's U.S. $75,000
is not enough to adequately compensate them for losses sus-
tained 5' and therefore inevitably attempt to establish "willful
misconduct," the issues of liability and damages under the War-
saw System have been and still are extensively litigated.54 More-
over, the dissatisfaction with the low liability limits of the Warsaw
System has led to various judicial attempts to circumvent the
limits over the years. 5
IV. INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION
ASSOCIATION INTERCARRIER AGREEMENT OF
1996
A. AIR CARRIER SELF-REGULATION
All facets of the industry remained critical of the Warsaw Sys-
tem, since the Montreal Interim Agreement of 1966, regarding
its inability to provide fair and swift compensation to passengers
killed or injured on international flights. Air carriers, arguably
the most frustrated critics, 5 6 decided to take the initiative and
ming flight paths and flight crew's decision deciding not to return to flight's last
refueling stop to avoid risk of disciplinary action).
53 In today's dollars, one needs about U.S. $330,000 to equal the buying power
of U.S. $75,000-the limit set in 1966. See Reske, supra note 3, at 23.
54 See GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 8, at 97.
55 See id. For good discussions of judicial treatment of the provisions of, and
past and present damage recovery under, the Warsaw Convention, see Andrea L.
Buff, Note, Reforming the Liability Provisions of the Warsaw Convention: Does the JATA
Intercarrier Agreement Eliminate the Need to Amend the Convention?, 20 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 1768, 1791-1813 (1997) (discussing U.S. courts' treatment of the Warsaw
Convention's liability limits, the varying definitions of willful misconduct, the
availability of punitive and emotional distress damages, as well as various methods
used by the courts to skirt the limits, such as interpreting the Convention to re-
quire an exclusive cause of action, refusing to find an "accident," a "passenger,"
or the requisite "embarking or disembarking" occurred, which are all necessary
to trigger the application of the Convention) and Katherine A. Staton, The War-
saw Convention's Facelifi: Will it Meet the Needs of 21st Century Air Travel?, 62J. AIR
L. & COM. 1083, 1086-1103 (1997) (tracing damage recovery under the Warsaw
Convention through Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, Co., 116 S. Ct. 629 (1996)
and its progeny).
56 Air carriers especially desired to eliminate the lengthy, and therefore costly,
litigation arising from major international air disasters. See Barry & Whalen,
supra note 33, at 382. Under the limited liability regime of the Warsaw System, if
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avoid the long delay associated with a government-led effort.57
On October 31, 1995, foreign and domestic airlines met under
the auspices of the International Air Transport Association
(IATA) 5' and subsequently adopted a resolution entitled the
"Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability" that supersedes
the Warsaw Convention's personal injury damage limitations.59
As a result, most of the important airlines in the world effectively
waived the limitations of liability available to them under the
Warsaw Convention, yet the legal consequences of the agree-
ment are far from clear because the resolution amounts to a
contract, not a treaty or law.6 °
B. WARSAW CONVENTION "SPECIAL CONTRACT"
Airlines cannot legally alter the Warsaw Convention; the Con-
vention is a treaty and can be amended only by its signatories, in
accordance with the procedures provided by the Convention it-
self.6' Even the express terms of the Convention provide that
air carriers cannot try to change or "infringe the rules laid down
by this convention, whether by deciding the law to be applied,
or by altering the rules as to jurisdiction .... ,,62 However, the
Convention also provides, "[N]evertheless, by special contract,
the carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of lia-
bility."6" Thus, the carriers at the IATA meeting, similar to the
parties to the Montreal Interim Agreement, sought to effect the
change in the limits of liability by incorporating certain provi-
sions into contracts with passengers for carriage-tickets-
a passenger is severely injured or killed, he or his family will inevitably seek to
prove "willful misconduct" to overcome the liability limit, therefore dictating a
lengthy process of determining liability and subsequently determining proper
awards. See id. Besides avoiding lengthy and costly litigation, the airlines and
other critics also recognized the value of the losses attributed to air disasters.
57 See International Effort to Update 68-year Isicl Old Treaty on Passenger Liability
Picks Up Momentum, AIRLINE FIN. NEWS, May 19, 1997, at 20 [hereinafter Interna-
tional Effort].
58 The IATA is a private organization whose membership is comprised of inter-
national air carriers and is also instrumental in determining the form of flight
tickets and waybills. See GoLnHIRSCII, supra note 8, at 4. IATA's purpose is to
"promote safe, regular, and economic air transport." Id.
5' See Patrick Grady & John S. Hoff, Bye, Bye 'Warsaw', LAw PILOTS B. ASS'N J.,
Winter 1996, at 23-24.
60 See Lee S. Kreindler, Goodbye to Liability Limitations, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1997, at
3.
6, See Barry & Whalen, supra note 33, at 381.
62 Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 32.
63 Id. art. 22(1).
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under the theory that this method is just such a mechanism of
"special contract" or agreement as permitted in Article 22(1).6"
C. THE AGREEMENTS COLLECTIVELY KNOWN AS
IATA INTERCARRIER AGREEMENT
Now a reality,65 the IATA Intercarrier Agreement actually is
the formal name for three separate agreements: the IATA Inter-
carrier Agreement on Passenger Liability (IIA),66 the IATA
Agreement on Measures to Implement the IATA Intercarrier
Agreement (MIA),67 and the Air Transport Association's68 Provi-
sions Implementing the IATA Intercarrier Agreement to be In-
cluded in Conditions of Carriage and Tariffs (IPA).69 Intended
to operate in connection with each other, the agreements effec-
tively waive the Warsaw Convention's limit of liability for the
claim of death, wounding, or other bodily injury to passengers
while allowing a claimant to recover full compensation for prov-
able damages without shouldering the burden of proving willful
misconduct on the part of the carrier. 7
See Barry & Whalen, supra note 33, at 381. The mechanism of an intercar-
tier agreement to raise the Warsaw Convention's liability limits had been invoked
successfully in the previous Montreal Interim Agreement. See discussion on the
Montreal Interim Agreement, infra Part III.B.
At least in the United States. All American flag carriers have signed all three
agreements collectively known as the LATA Intercarrier Agreement and, on No-
vember 12, 1996, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) approved it,
pendente lite, subject to certain conditions. See Dep't of Transp., Order Approving
International Air Transport Association: Agreement Relating to Liability Limita-
tions of the Warsaw Convention; Air Transport Association of America: Agree-
ment Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention, Order No. 96-
11-6 (Nov. 12, 1996), available in WESTLAW, Ftran-dot Database [hereinafter
DOT Order Approving Agreements], as modified by DOT Reconsideration Or-
der, supra note 47.
IATA Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability, Oct. 31, 1995 [herein-
after IIA] reprinted in 1 KREINDLER, supra note 23, § 10.11, at 10-142.
67 Agreement on Measures to Implement the IATA Intercarrier Agreement,
May 1996 [hereinafter MIA] reprinted in 1 KREINDLER, supra note 23, § 10.11, at
10-144.
68 The Air Transport Association of America (ATA) is a private organization of
air carriers that generally represents the interests of U.S. airlines. See Staton,
supra note 55, at 1104 n.148 (citing Air Transport Association of America on
DOT Order 96-10-7, at 1 n.1 (Oct. 3 1996)).
- ATA Provisions Implementing the IATA Intercarrier Agreement to be In-
cluded in Conditions of Carriage and Tariffs, opened for signature May 16, 1996
[hereinafter IPA] (on file with the author).
70 See Robert P. Warren, The Future and Effect of the IATA Intercarrier Agreements
on Passenger Liability: A U.S. Perspective, 11 AIR & SPACE LAW. 3 (1996); Barry &
Whalen, supra note 33, at 382.
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Each agreement has a separate purpose in operating in con-
nection with the others. The IIA provides a general framework
to guide each carrier in incorporating general principles into
the carrier's conditions of carriage and tariff filings."1 The IPA
pertains to U.S. carriers implementing the IIA and MIA provi-
sions, 2 while the MIA further defines the IIA and provides
mandatory and optional provisions for carriers to include in
their conditions of carriage and tariff filings.7" Although the IIA
provides the overall framework of the Intercarrier Agreement, it
is only an "umbrella" agreement, requiring air carriers to de-
velop appropriate provisions to implement it through their con-
ditions of carriage and tariffs filed with governments, either
unilaterally or by further agreement." The MIA addresses the
language a carrier needs to incorporate the IIA into its condi-
tions of carriage and tariff filings.7 5 In contrast, the IPA is the
special contract by which U.S. carriers will implement the IIA
and MIA into their conditions of carriage and tariff filings, and
thereby terminate each carrier's participation in the Montreal
Interim Agreement of 1966.76 All major U.S. carriers are signa-
tories to the IPA.77
D. EFFECT OF IATA INTERCARRIER AGREEMENT
As a result of the IATA Intercarrier Agreement, and with re-
spect to travel to and from the United States, a strict liability
standard would be applied to any claim not exceeding 100,000
Special Drawing Rights (SDR),v inclusive of legal fees and costs,
with the presumption of liability contained in Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention remaining applicable. 9 In principal effect,
71 See IIA, supra note 66.
72 See IPA, supra note 69.
73 See MIA, supra note 67.
74 See Staton, supra note 55, at 1108.
75 See MIA, supra note 67.
76 See IPA, supra note 69.
77 See id. at E.
78 Special Drawing Rights (SDR) is an international monetary unit created and
defined by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and is an international re-
serve asset, although it is only an accounting entry, not actual coin or paper and
not backed by precious metal. See Barry & Whalen, supra note 33, at 382. The
100,000 SDR equals approximately U.S. $135,000. See IMF, Exchange Rates in
Terms of SDRs (visited May 10, 1998) <http://www.imf.org/> [hereinafter SDR
Exchange Rates]. The Draft Convention developed by the ICAO also authorizes
and requires the use of SDR. See Draft Convention, infra note 91, art. 21; Weber
& Jakob, ICAO Taking Initiative, supra note 51, at 22.
79 See MIA, supra note 67, at 1(2).
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the IATA Intercarrier Agreement provides that the claimant is
entitled to unlimited provable damages. The air carrier is
strictly liable up to 100,000 SDR if the claimant can prove that
the damage was caused by an accident. In addition, in order to
avoid further liability for amounts over 100,000 SDR, the carrier
has the burden to prove that it or its agents took all necessary
measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for the
carrier to take such measures, as provided in Article 20 of the
Warsaw Convention. °
International travelers who are ticketed to, from, or through
the United States now have full compensation available on a
strict liability basis under the provisions of the IATA Intercarrier
Agreements, and in particular under the MIA. The agreements
provide for no per passenger limits and for damages consistent
with U.S. tort law.8 ' The carriers are not subject to punitive
damages,8 2 and they retain their non-negligent defense for
claims exceeding 100,000 SDR. Plaintiffs will still bear the bur-
den of proving compensatory damages.8 3
E. INTERCARRIER AGREEMENT NOT A
PERMANENT ANSWER TO THE PROBLEM
While the joint, self-regulatory effort of the IATA and the ATA
has had the support of many domestic and international air car-
riers,84 the International Chamber of Commerce, 5 and the As-
sociation of Trial Lawyers of America,86 there is a tremendous
amount of uncertainty relating to the success of the agreements,
thus leading to the conclusion that the agreements do not offer
a permanent answer. First of all, the attachment of additional
conditions by the DOT to its approval order8 7 has, to some ex-
8o See id. at 1(3); Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 20.
81 See Staton, supra note 55, at 1107.
82 See id.
83 See id.
84 See Matthew L. Wald, Step to Raise Liability Limit in Air Crashes: U.S. Acts to
Remove Ceiling of $75,000, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1996, at 39. By May 1997,85 carriers
had signed the original 1995 agreements and 53 had signed a subsequent imple-
mentation agreement, but only the major U.S. airlines and 17 non-U.S. airlines
had implemented the agreements. See International Effort, supra note 57, at 20.
85 See ICC Urges DOT Approval of Higher Airline Liability Limits, AVIATION DAILY,
Aug. 22, 1996, at 306.
86 See Trial Lawyers Back Passenger Liability Limit Increases, AVIATION DAILY, Aug.
26, 1996, at 320.
87 See DOT Order Approving Agreements, supra note 65; DOT Reconsidera-
tion Order, supra note 47. DOT approved the IATA Intercarrier Agreement con-
ditioned on agreement that the carriers cannot invoke Article 22(1) of the
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tent, diluted the impact that the IATA Intercarrier Agreement
will have on international aviation liability.8" Second, with the
elimination of the air carrier's "no-negligence" defense and with
claimants no longer having to prove willful misconduct, the
IATA Intercarrier Agreement essentially eliminates the fault sys-
tem, which is necessary to maintain acceptable standards of
safety and security in aviation. Can the standards of air carriers
be the same with knowledge that a premium is no longer placed
on being able to prove "all necessary measures" were taken to
avoid an accident? I think not. Finally, and most detrimental to
the success of the IATA Intercarrier Agreement, is the fact it is
essentially a contract that does not carry the status of law that a
treaty carries.
Because the IATA Intercarrier Agreement is based on con-
tract and not law, the need to formally amend the Warsaw Con-
vention's liability provisions remains because contractual
agreements cannot achieve the dual goals of uniform liability
limits and systematic legal procedures set out by the drafters of
the Warsaw Convention. An air carrier bound by a private con-
tract is just not the same as being held to the letter of the law or
a globally-adopted treaty.
Besides air carriers being far less reluctant to opt out of an
intercarrier contract in contrast to an international treaty, other
collateral concerns must-and likely will-be addressed, but
only in the courts where the answer will not be very clear. For
example, a problem arises when an air carrier, pursuant to the
Intercarrier Agreement, pays out for injury or death to a passen-
ger and then seeks contribution or indemnification from a man-
ufacturer. To contest its liability, the manufacturer would likely
assert that the airline paid out voluntarily, rather than by virtue
of the law and, thus, the airline has no recourse against the man-
ufacturer for any amounts above the Warsaw Convention limita-
Warsaw Convention's limitation of liability or the Warsaw Convention's "all nec-
essary measures defense" set forth in Article 20(1) of the Convention to that part
of the claim that does not exceed 100,000 SDR. See id. For an analysis of the
conditions that the DOT attached to its approval order, see AJ. Harakas, The
Status of the Warsaw Convention Limits on Liability-The IATA and ATA of America File
Applications with the U.S. DOT for Approval of the Intercarrier Agreement and Implement-
ing Agreement of Passenger Liability, AVIATION Q., Oct. 1996, at 115-23.
88 See DOT Faces Wide Opposition to its Liability Limit Conditions, AVIATION DAILY,
Oct. 28, 1996, at 154; DOT Conditions Could "Derail" World Liability Agreement, AIR
SAFETv WK., Oct. 14, 1996.
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tion. o Similarly, the claimant, after being compensated by the
airline under the IATA Intercarrier Agreement could then sue
the manufacturer separately and assert that she was a third-party
beneficiary to the intercarrier contract and that the payment
made by the airline was not payment of a legal judgment but was
one paid by a collateral source and, thus, being no different
from payments made under a life insurance policy, could not be
used by the tortfeasor manufacturer to set off its liability. 90
V. INTRODUCING THE ANSWER: ICAO DRAFT
CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION OF
CERTAIN RULES FOR INTERNATIONAL
CARRIAGE BY AIR
While the IATA Intercarrier Agreements were near the end of
development in 1996, the Legal Bureau of the ICAO, assisted by
an ICAO Secretariat Study Group, also began the process of de-
veloping a draft of a new international convention9 to modern-
ize and consolidate the Warsaw System's provisions on air
carrier liability.92 After its inception, the ICAO Council noted
89 The doctrines of indemnity and contribution generally preclude one from
recovering any "voluntary payments" made to third parties. To recover against a
joint tortfeasor or the manufacturer, the airline would have to prove that the
amounts it paid to the passenger were "legally irresistible." Since the airline vol-
untarily waived the Warsaw Convention limitations, it could be argued the waiver
is inconsistent with the airline asserting it could not legally resist paying the
amount it did. See Barry & Whalen, supra note 33, at 385.
90 See Kreindler, supra note 60, at 3.
91 Draft Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Car-
riage by Air, May 9, 1997 [hereinafter Draft Convention] (on file with the au-
thor). Because the majority present at the meeting sought consolidation of the
entire Warsaw System with all its complexities, a single convention was created as
opposed to the creation of another amending protocol, thus avoiding the perpet-
uation of the tangled web of legal instruments and agreements now existing. See
Weber & Jakob, Draft Convention, supra note 16, at 5. In addition, if the new
instrument took the form of an amending protocol, it would be unclear what it
should amend. See id. at 6. Amending the original Warsaw Convention would
cover only those signatory nations that have ratified it, but not the Hague Proto-
col. Revising the Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol would
cover only those nations that ratified the Hague Protocol, thereby excluding
those, such as the United States, that only ratified the original Warsaw Conven-
tion. See id. It should be noted, however, that the IATA felt modernization could
be achieved simply through inserting limited amendments-the amendments, of
course, being restricted to the terms of the IATA Intercarrier Agreement. See id.
at 5.
92 See 1996 Annual Report of the Council, at 51, ICAO Doc. 9685 (1997) [herein-
after Annual Report]. The ICAO first conducted a socio-economic study analyzing
air carrier liability limits throughout the world. The results indicated that dissat-
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the Draft Convention and forwarded it to the ICAO Legal Com-
mittee which approved the text of the draft treaty in its thirtieth
session on May 9, 1997. 93
A. DRAFT CONVENTION RETAINS THE STRUCTURE OF THE
WARSAW CONVENTION
The Draft Convention preserves the structure of the Warsaw
Convention while consolidating provisions of existing legal in-
struments such as the Hague Protocol of 1955 and Montreal
Protocols of 1975 for incorporation into the Draft Convention.:
By maintaining the main format of the Warsaw Convention, the
Draft Convention proposes to sustain sixty years of established
judicial precedents in interpreting the Warsaw Convention and
allow the aviation industry to continue to benefit from them. 5
Nevertheless, despite retention of the structure of the Warsaw
Convention, certain rules relating to the liability regime and lia-
bility limits have been modernized under the Draft Convention
in order to conform to the needs of the international aviation
environment of the twenty-first century. 6
As a comprehensive overhaul of the entire Warsaw System,
97
the Draft Convention has the same scope of application as the
original Warsaw System of 1929. 9' Although the Draft Conven-
tion serves as a complete revision, the most significant provi-
isfaction with the Warsaw System was not confined to isolated geographic areas.
See Weber &Jakob, Draft Convention, supra note 16, at 5.
93 See id.
94 See Weber &Jakob, Current Developments, supra note 20, at 312. Even certain
provisions of Montreal Protocol No. 4 have been incorporated into the Draft
Convention. See id.
q5 See Weber &Jakob, Draft Convention, supra note 16, at 5. In fact, a compari-
son of the language found in the Draft Convention to the language of the origi-
nal Warsaw Convention reveals, to a large extent, the same wording.
96 See id.
97 The language in the preamble of the Draft Convention is indicative of its
purpose, recognizing "the need to modernize and consolidate the Warsaw Con-
vention and related instruments..." and "the importance of ensuring protection
of the interests of consumers in international carriage by air and the need for
equitable compensation based on the principle of restitution .... " Draft Con-
vention, supra note 91. In comparison to previous attempts of other entities, the
goal of the Draft Convention is to maintain the Warsaw Convention's basic struc-
ture as an instrument of international law while responding to concerns about
modernizing passenger liability limits. See Weber & Jakob, Current Developments,
supra note 20, at 313.
98 The Draft Convention "applies to all international carriage of persons, bag-
gage or cargo performed by aircraft for reward ... [and] [i] t applies equally to
gratuitous carriage by aircraft performed by an air transport undertaking." Draft
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sions of the text approved by the ICAO Legal Committee are, of
course, those that address air carrier liability in international avi-
ation disasters and, in effect, remove the antiquated restraints in
cases involving personal injuries or accidental death of passen-
gers on international flights. 9
B. Two-TIERED LIABILITY SYSTEM UNDER THE
DRA-r CONVENTION
The Warsaw Convention currently limits the liability of carri-
ers. Typically the limit is either U.S. $8300 or U.S. $16,600, de-
pending on which legal instrument governs the disaster (either
the original Warsaw Convention or the Convention as modified
by the Hague Protocol of 1955). But a "special contract" (such
as the Montreal Interim Agreement of 1966 or the IATA Inter-
Convention, supra note 91, art. 1(2). Furthermore, for the purposes of the Draft
Convention,
the expression international carriage means any carriage which, ac-
cording to the contract between the parties, the place of departure
and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the
carriage or a transhipment [sic], are situated either within the terri-
tories of two States Parties, or within the territory of a single State
Party if there is an agreed stopping place within the territory of
another State, even if that State is not a State Party. Carriage be-
tween two points within the territory of a single State Party without
an agreed stopping place within the territory of another State is not
international carriage for the purposes of this Convention.
Id. This is consistent with the definition of international carriage in Article 1 (1)
of the Warsaw Convention. See Warsaw Convention supra note 2. Also consistent
with the Warsaw Convention,
[clarriage to be performed by several successive carriers is deemed,
for purposes of this Convention, to be one undivided carriage if it
has been regarded by the parties as single operation, whether it had
been agreed upon under the form of a single contract or a series of
contracts, and it does not lose its international character merely
because one contract or a series of contracts is to be performed
entirely within the territory of the same state.
Draft Convention, supra note 91, art. 1(3).
99 See Draft Treaty in Progress, AIRLINE FIN. NEWS, May 19, 1997, at 20.
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carrier Agreement of 1996).00 may allow higher limits where the
plaintiff can prove willful misconduct of a carrier." 1
In contrast, the Draft Convention creates, for the most part, a
two-tiered liability system in cases of accidental death or passen-
ger injury. For claims of up to approximately U.S. $135,000 °2-
the first tier-the liability of the air carrier is based on the prin-
ciple of strict liability.10 3 For claims exceeding this amount-the
second tier-liability of the air carrier is based on fault, without
numerical limitations on liability.' °4 Unlike the first tier, second
tier liability is dependent upon (1) a passenger proving that the
air carrier was negligent; or (2) the air carrier proving that it was
either free of fault, that it carried out all possible steps to thwart
the air disaster, or that preventative measures were
impossible. 10 5
The provisions effecting a new liability regime are found in
Chapter III of the Draft Convention entitled "Liability of the
Carrier and Extent of Compensation for Damage.' ' 6 Article 16
initially sets out liability for carriers in the case of passenger
death or injury:
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or
bodily or mental injury of a passenger upon condition only that
the accident which caused the death or injury took place on
board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of
embarking or disembarking. However, the carrier is not liable if
the death or injury resulted solely from the state of health of the
passenger.07
100 See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. As "special contracts" allowed
by Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention, the Montreal Interim Agreement (of
which any international flights to, from, or through the United States are subject
to) and the IATA Intercarrier Agreement cannot carry the legal weight of a
treaty, but are, in effect, contracts between the signatory airlines and its passen-
gers. See discussion of the Montreal Interim Agreement, supra Part IIIB; discus-
sion of the International Air Transport Association Intercarrier Agreement, supra
Part IV; Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 22(1).
101 See Committee Approves Draft Convention, supra note 7, at 27.
102 The approximate equivalent of 100,000 SDR. See SDR Exchange Rates, supra
note 78.
103 In other words, the passenger or the person entitled to claim on the passen-
ger's behalf will be able to obtain full economic restitution with respect to proven
damages sustained in an accident regardless of fault on the part of the air carrier.
See Weber &Jakob, Draft Convention, supra note 16, at 6.
104 See id.
105 See Draft Treaty in Progress, supra note 99, at 20.
106 See Draft Convention, supra note 91, arts. 16-31.
107 Id. at art. 16.
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Article 20, the most important provision for air carrier liability
in the Draft Convention, contains the framework for the liability
regime itself, introducing the so-called two-tier liability system
and effectively eliminating the caps on damage recovery con-
tained in the Warsaw Convention.' °8 Article 20 presently con-
tains three alternatives to the two-tiered system subject to the
adoption of the ICAO Contracting States at the Diplomatic
Conference. 109
108 See Draft Convention, supra note 91, art. 20; Draft Treaty in Progress, supra
note 99, at 20.
109 See Draft Convention, supra note 91, art. 20. In Article 20, the ICAO Legal
Committee provided the following alternatives to govern compensation in the
case of death or injury of passengers:
ALTERNATIVE 1
[1. Subject to paragraph 2, the carrier shall not be liable for dam-
ages arising under Article 16, paragraph 1 which exceed 100,000
Special Drawing Rights:
(a) if the carrier proves that it and its servants or agents took all
measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the damage,
or that it was impossible for it or them to take such measures; or
(b) unless the damage so sustained was due to the fault or neglect
of the carrier or of its servants or agents acting within their scope of
employment or agency.
2. At the time of ratification, adherence or accession, each State
Party shall declare which of either subparagraph (a) or subpara-
graph (b) of the preceding paragraph shall be applicable to it and
its carriers. A State Party which has declared that subparagraph (b)
shall be applicable to it, may later make such declaration in respect
of subparagraph (a) instead. All declarations made under this par-
agraph shall be binding on all other States Parties and the Deposi-
tary shall notify all States Parties of such declarations.]
ALTERNATIVE 2
[1. The liability of the carrier for damages arising under Article 16,
paragraph 1, shall not exceed 100,000 Special Drawing Rights if the
carrier proves that it and its servants or agents took all measures
that could reasonably be required to avoid the damage or that it
was impossible for it or them to take such measures.
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, any State Party may
by notification to the Depositary at the time of ratification or ac-
ceptance, or thereafter, declare, that in any action brought before a
court within its territory, the liability of the carrier for damages aris-
ing under Article 16, paragraph I shall be limited to 100,000 Spe-
cial Drawing Rights, unless the damage so sustained was due to the
fault or neglect of carrier or of its servants or agents acting within
their scope of employment. The Depositary shall inform all other
States Parties accordingly and shall keep current a list of States Par-
ties having made such declaration.]
ALTERNATIVE 3
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1. Proposed Alternatives of a Two-Tiered System
Each of the alternatives from which the ICAO Contracting
States have to choose with regard to first-tier liability covers
claims up to 100,000 Special Drawing Rights (SDR),"1 ° exclusive
of awarded court costs and attorney's fees,"' and eliminates the
need for plaintiffs to prove airline fault for an accident.1 2 In
effect, claims for damages up to approximately U.S. $135,000
(100,000 SDR) would be governed by strict liability principles;
plaintiffs would merely have to provide proof of damage suf-
fered as a result of the accident in order to be compensated." 3
This would simplify and considerably shorten compensation
procedures for most aviation disaster victims."'
With regard to second tier liability, the delegates could not
reach a consensus on the burden of proof issue-namely,
whether, in order for recovery to exceed 100,000 SR, the claim-
[ 1. Subject to paragraph 2 of this Article, the liability of the carrier
for damages arising under Article 16, paragraph 1, shall not exceed
100,000 Special Drawing Rights if the carrier proves that it and its
servants and agents took all measures that could reasonably be re-
quired to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for it or them
to take such measures.
2. The liability of the carrier above an amount of [the Legal Com-
mittee left the amount to be set by the Diplomatic Conference in
case it would decide in favor of Alternative 3] Special Drawing
Rights shall be subject to proof that the damage sustained by the
passenger was due to the fault or neglect of the carrier or its ser-
vants or agents acting within their scope or employment.]
Id. (alterations in original).
110 The Draft Convention authorizes and requires the use of Special Drawing
Rights (SDR), the international monetary unit defined by the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF). See Draft Convention, supra note 91, art. 21; Weber & Jakob,
ICAO Taking Initiative, supra note 51, at 22. The 100,000 SDR amount equals
approximately U.S. $135,000, a substantial increase from the Warsaw Convention,
yet the United States has indicated that it will try to have the cap raised to 250,000
SDR, the equivalent of approximately U.S. $340,000. See Draft Treaty in Progress,
supra note 99, at 20 (U.S. dollar figures adjusted to current SDR rate). Although
it seems unlikely that the cap will be raised to that which the United States pre-
fers, the ICAO Legal Committee did leave the actual damage threshold amount
in the first tier to be determined by the upcoming Diplomatic Conference. See
Draft Convention, supra note 91, Explanatory Memorandum in Attachment B,
1 n.1.
111 See Draft Convention, supra note 91, art. 21(3) ("[t]he limits prescribed in
Article 20 . . . shall not prevent the court from awarding, in accordance with its
own law, in addition, the whole or part of the court costs and.., expenses of the
litigation incurred by the plaintiff, including interest.").
112 See Draft Convention, supra note 91, art. 20.
113 See id.; see also Committee Approves Draft Convention, supra note 7, at 27.
114 See Committee Approves Draft Convention, supra note 7, at 27.
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ant must prove airline negligence or conversely the airline must
prove either it was not at fault, it took all possible measures to
prevent the accident, or preventative measures were unavaila-
ble 5 Therefore, in Alternative 1, each State party, upon ratifi-
cation, must determine and notify which regime provided for in
paragraph 1 of Alternative 1 will be applicable to its carriers:
either the carrier has the burden or the claimant has the bur-
den.' 16 Under Alternative 2, each State party would have the
possibility of "opting out" of the liability regime provided in par-
agraph 1 of Alternative 2, which requires a presumption of the
air carrier's fault, in favor of a regime that places the burden of
proof on the claimant.' 17 While both Alternatives 1 and 2 retain
the so-called two-tiered liability system, it appears that Alterna-
tive 3 establishes a three-tiered liability regime: (1) strict liability
in the first tier up to 100,000 SDR, (2) presumed fault of the
carrier in the second tier to go above 100,000 SDR, and (3)
placement of the burden of proof on the claimant in the third
tier in order for the claimant to recover beyond an SDR amount
to be set by the Diplomatic Conference, which in turn limits sec-
ond tier liability."'
2. Draft Convention "Updating Clause"
Another significant aspect of the Draft Convention is the in-
corporation of an "updating clause". This procedure is
designed to ensure that the remaining limits of liability retain
their value against inflation.119 The updating clause would re-
quire that the limits of liability be reviewed at five year intervals
115 See Draft Convention, supra note 91, art. 20. While some delegations pre-
ferred the burden to rest with the plaintiff to prove the fault of the air carrier, the
majority of the delegations preferred the air carrier be required to prove it had
taken all reasonable measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible to do
so. See id., Explanatory Memorandum in Attachment B, 1. The inability of the
delegates to reach a clear consensus concerning second tier liability, or responsi-
bility for the burden of proof, prompted the development of the three alterna-
tives presently in Article 20 of the Draft Convention. See id.
116 See Draft Convention, supra note 109; see also Draft Convention, supra note
91, Explanatory Memorandum in Attachment B, 1.
117 See id.
I18 See Draft Convention, supra note 109; see also Draft Convention, supra note
91, Explanatory Memorandum in Attachment B, 1. The ICAO Legal Commit-
tee left the amount over which would require the burden of proof on the claim-
ant to be set by the Diplomatic Conference in case it did decide in favor of
Alternative 3 in article 20. See Draft Convention, supra note 91, art. 20, Alterna-
tive 3, Secretariat Note.
119 See Draft Convention, supra note 91, art. 21(5)(a).
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and thereby allowing the parties to the ultimate Convention,
along with the ICAO Council, to initiate and implement an ad-
justment in accordance with changing economic conditions. 12 0
An adjustment is necessitated at the close of the five year period
if the average accumulated rate of inflation based on the
"weighted average of the annual rates of increase or decrease in
the Consumer Price Indices of the States whose currencies com-
prise the Special Drawing Right," exceeds ten percent since the
previous revision or "the date of entry into force of the Conven-
tion."1 2 A two-thirds vote of the ICAO Council is required for
the adoption of the revision and becomes effective six months
after its submission to the nations that are parties to the ultimate
Convention, unless within three months a majority of such na-
tions register their disapproval with the Council.' 22
C. OTHER SIGNIFICANT PROVISIONS
Not only would the Draft Convention substantially revise the
air carrier liability regime, it may also resolve a long-standing
debate by providing for an additional forum or "fifth jurisdic-
tion"12 for the filing and adjudication of claims made under the
Draft Convention against an air carrier: 124 the passenger's domi-
cile. But the text and effect of the provision allowing the addi-
tional forum have been left as a whole for final consideration by
the Diplomatic Conference because, although a consensus had
been reached that a link should be required as between the pas-
120 See id. The first review to take place at the conclusion of the fifth year fol-
lowing the date the Convention goes into force. See id.
121 Id. The exact wording of this clause was left for final decision by the Diplo-
matic Conference. See id. art. 21(5)(a), Secretariat Note,
122 See id. art. 21(5) (b).
123 See Weber &Jakob, Draft Convention, supra note 16, at 7. The argument in
favor of providing for the passenger's domicile as an additional forum is that it
would be available in the absence of the Warsaw Convention under general prin-
ciples of private international law. See id. On the other hand, many carriers and
governments are concerned about defending claims in a jurisdiction that will
favor its citizens and allow for unreasonable damage awards. See id.
124 See Draft Convention, supra note 91, art. 27. Under the Warsaw Conven-
tion, the plaintiff has the option of where to bring the lawsuit but is limited to the
country of the air carrier's domicile, the country of the air carrier's principal
place of business, the country in which the contract for air travel was made, or
the country of the passenger's final destination regardless of whether the passen-
ger traveled on more than one airline. See supra note 38. It should be noted that
the "fifth jurisdiction" would only be allowed with "respect [to] damage resulting
from the death or injury of a passenger." Draft Convention, supra note 91, art.
27(2). For other actions for damages the fora available to the plaintiff would be
the same as under the Warsaw Convention. See id. art. 27(1).
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senger's domicile or permanent residence and the "operational
presence of the air carrier," no compromise could be reached
with regard to what type of link was necessary. 25 Final decisions
of the Diplomatic Conference must also be made as to whether
arbitration would be an alternative means for settlement 26 and
as to whether to include in the new legal instrument a compul-
sory insurance requirement.127
Although the system of liability in the Draft Convention sub-
stantially enhances the legal position of the claimant, the liabil-
ity regime does exclude, in both tiers, the possibility of punitive
or exemplary damages, only allowing recovery for compensatory
damages, or damage actually suffered, the extent of which, of
course, must be proven by the claimant.1 2  This seems to be
consistent with the trend of the courts disallowing punitive dam-
125 See id. Explanatory Memorandum in Attachment B, 2. Article 27(2) ex-
pressly provides that
[i]n respect of damage resulting from the death or injury of a pas-
senger, the action may be brought before one of the Courts men-
tioned in paragraph 1 of this Article [which provides for the
original fora designated under the Warsaw Convention] or in the
territory of a State Party in which the passenger has his or her dom-
icile or permanent residence and to and from which the carrier
operates services for the carriage by air [and] [or] in which the car-
rier has an establishment.
Id. art. 27(2). The issue among the delegations was whether to employ the word
"and" or "or" in the provision to establish the necessary link between the carrier
and the passenger's domicile or residence, the latter allowing for a broader range
of additional fora. Although the meaning of the word "establishment" for pur-
poses of Article 27(2) was also left to the Diplomatic Conference to clarify, Article
27(2) preliminarily defines it as "premises leased or owned by the carrier con-
cerned from which, [through its own managerial and administrative employees,]
it conducts its business of carriage by air." Id. art. 27(3) (alteration in original).
Again the bracketed portion represents that which is to be clarified by the Diplo-
matic Conference. See id. Explanatory Memorandum in Attachment B, 2.
126 See id. art. 28.
127 See id. art. 45.
128 See id. art. 23; Weber &Jakob, Draft Convention, supra note 16, at 6. Article
23 of the Draft, entitled "Basis of Claims" provides:
1. In the carriage of passengers.., any action for damages, however
founded, whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort
or otherwise, can only be brought subject to the conditions and
such limits on liability as are set out in this Convention without
prejudice to the question as to who are the persons who have the
right to bring suit and what are their respective rights.
2. For the purposes of this Convention the term "damages" does
not include punitive, exemplary or other non-compensatory
damages.
Id. (emphasis added).
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ages under the Warsaw system. 129 In fact, the few courts which
have most recently addressed the issue have held that punitive
damages are not recoverable as a matter of law against the air
carrier in a case governed by the Warsaw Convention."')
In addition, the Draft Convention further takes the interests
of the air carrier into account by retaining the Warsaw Conven-
tion provision for the air carrier defense of contributory negli-
gence in both tiers of liability.' 3' Moreover, under the Draft
Convention, the right of the air carrier to take recourse against
a liable third party, irrespective of the air carrier's being strictly
liable to the passenger in the first tier, is also maintained. 132
Other than the noteworthy modifications and consistencies
aforementioned, the Draft Convention provisions, as well as its
probable effects, predominantly parallel the language and provi-
sions of the original Warsaw Convention. For instance, the
mechanism of "special contract" is still available to effect higher
limits of liability than those provided for in the Draft Conven-
tion,13 3 yet such a mechanism still cannot relieve the carrier of
liability or fix a lower limit."'
VI. OUTSTANDING ISSUES
The Draft Convention has been received by all ICAO Con-
tracting States and non-Contracting States and could be
adopted as early as 1999,135 but may take several years more to
129 See Barry & Whalen, supra note 33, at 384-85; Kelly Compton Grems, Puni-
tive Damages Under the Warsaw Convention: Revisiting the Drafters' Intent, 41 AM. U.
L. REv. 141, 157-158 (1991). Due to the lack of specificity as to the nature of
damages collectible in international aviation disasters, courts have struggled with
this issue. See Barbara J. Buono, The Recoverability of Punitive Damages Under the
Warsaw Convention in Cases of Willful Misconduct: Is the Sky the Limit?, 13 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 570, 582 (1990).
131 See Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd on
other grounds, 499 U.S. 530 (1991); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983,
932 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cet. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991); In reAir Disaster
at Lockerbie, Scot. of Dec. 21, 1988, 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1991).
1." See Draft Convention, supra note 91, art. 19.
132 See id. art. 31.
133 See id. art. 21 (6).
134 See id. art. 22.
15 See Annual Report, supra note 92, at 51. Prior to ratification, a new treaty first
must be formally adopted by the 185 Contracting States of the ICAO at a Diplo-
matic Conference called by the ICAO Council expected to be held in 1998. After
formal adoption, the treaty must then be ratified by thirty of the nations in order
to be in force. See International Effort, supra note 57, at 20.
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be adopted by much of the world." 6 While most governments
and airlines would like to update the antiquated Warsaw System,
there are, nevertheless, outstanding issues that need to be set-
tled before the final text of the treaty can be hammered out.1 37
First, an issue which is yet to be resolved is the question of
who will have the burden of proving the negligent conduct of
the air carrier which is necessary for the air carrier's liability to
exceed the 100,000 SDR amount. The Draft Convention's provi-
sions may make it even more difficult for families to collect dam-
ages in comparison to the IATA Intercarrier Agreement. For
instance, the language in the Draft Convention requiring a pas-
senger to prove negligence on the airline's part would be a step
backwards from the IATA Intercarrier Agreement, which pro-
vides for the application of strict liability to all claims,1 38 while
strict liability is only applicable under the Draft Convention to
the extent the claims for damage do not exceed the 100,000
SDR threshold.139 However, requiring proof of air carrier negli-
gence for second tier liability is necessary. Without a fault sys-
tem consistent with current tort law, the aviation industry and
passengers will have watered down levels of safety and security or
at least a lack of future safety and security improvements. At any
rate, the three alternatives in Article 20 of the Draft Convention
specifically developed by the ICAO Legal Committee to resolve
136 While the consensus of many aviation officials is that it will take up to five
years for a treaty to be ratified after it is adopted by the ICAO contracting na-
tions, the process could be completed much sooner. See id. For instance, ap-
proval of a new treaty by North America, Europe, and the major aviation nations
of Asia would provide 38 countries; only 30 nations are needed to ratify the treaty
for it to be in force. See id.
137 See id. The United States is not expected to block treaty ratification, and
the DOT likely would recommend the treaty for required U.S. Senate ratification
if certain unsettled provisions are resolved at the Diplomatic Conference in a
manner acceptable to the DOT. One contentious issue is the DOT's interest in
allowing plaintiffs to sue in the country of a passenger's domicile, referred to as
fifth jurisdiction fights. This provision would help assure that lawsuits of relatives
of U.S. passengers are heard under U.S. law, regardless of the country in which
the ticket is bought. Under existing law, American citizens can have their case
heard in a U.S. court only if the ticket was purchased in the United States. See id.
This issue was left for resolution by the Diplomatic Conference.
138 See Draft Convention, supra note 91, art. 20. For example, paragraph 1 and
subparagraph (b) in Alternative 1 of Article 20 of the Draft provide, in part, "the
carrier shall not be liable for damages arising under Article 16, paragraph 1
which exceed 100,000 Special Drawing Rights... unless the damage so sustained
was due to the fault or neglect of the carrier or of its servants or agents acting
within their scope of employment or agency." Id.
139 See id.
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this issue will likely produce compromise at the Diplomatic
Conference.
Furthermore, removing the artificial passenger compensation
limits should help put an end to lengthy litigation, saving air-
lines legal costs and allowing families to recover their provable
damages sooner. Currently, to receive more than U.S. $75,000
limitation as set by the Montreal Interim Agreement in 1966, 1 40
family members of an air crash victim must overcome the diffi-
cult burden of proving the airline is guilty of "willful miscon-
duct," a form of gross negligence in some jurisdictions. Unlike
the current rules, full compensation is no longer predicated
upon the requirement of "willful misconduct" under either of
the Alternatives under Article 20 of the Draft Convention.14 1
However, the issue left to be resolved is not what amounts an
injured passenger can receive above the threshold set by the
Draft Convention, but what amount should constitute that
threshold. The 100,000 SDR amount, of approximately U.S.
$135,000, is a significant increase, especially when the passenger
is not required to prove willful misconduct to obtain higher
amounts and the "updating" mechanism provides for adjusting
the threshold amount for inflation and other factors in the fu-
ture. But the threshold, as it stands in the Draft, is already out
of date. Hopefully, the Diplomatic Conference will recognize
this and increase it even more, perhaps to 200,000 SDR as sug-
gested by the United States.
Another question is, who is going to bear the burden of in-
creased airlines payments for international air disasters. Obvi-
ously, relaxing the limits on air carrier liability will annually
increase the cost of claims paid out by airlines. Given the ex-
pected increase in premiums, insurers must pass on the cost of
increased claims to airlines, who will inevitably pass on such
costs to air travelers. Industry-wide liability payments can be ex-
pected to increase, on average, by U.S. $300 million annually for
airlines with international service, in effect doubling the indus-
try's annual passenger liability payments. 142 However, in 1996
U.S. $300 million would have represented only .02 percent of
the operating expenses for scheduled international operations
140 See Montreal Interim Agreement, supra note 8.
141 See Weber &Jakob, Draft Convention, supra note 16, at 6.
142 See International Effort, supra note 57, at 20. Experts estimate annual liability
payments have averaged U.S. $400 million in the 19 9 0 s, excluding unsettled
claims. See id.
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of IATA members. 43 Thus, although a substantial rise in ticket
prices would seem to follow, insurance underwriters believe that
the liability provisions of the Draft Convention would create
only negligible increases in ticket prices to cover air carriers' ad-
ditional insurance requirements.'44
Furthermore, the provision contained in the Draft Conven-
tion which creates air carrier liability for mental injury does not
seem viable. 4 5 This condition opens a whole new door and al-
lows passengers to sue without suffering any bodily injury.146
For instance, a passenger could try to recover damages for any
stress suffered while his flight experienced turbulence."' It
seems very unlikely that this provision will remain in the final
version of the treaty.14
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Warsaw System prevents air crash victims'
families from obtaining adequate compensation and resolving
their claims in a timely fashion. 149 The Draft Convention is the
143 See id.
144 See id. For example, on a London to Miami flight, the proposal would cost
air travelers an additional fifty cents a ticket and fifteen cents on the price of a
London to Paris ticket to cover the increased insurance premiums that airlines
would pay to abolish the liability limits established under the Warsaw System. See
Weber & Jakob, Current Developments, supra note 20, at 307 (reporting that the
Draft Convention's raising of the Warsaw Convention's liability limits would only
require increasing liability insurance costs for air carriers by nominal amounts
averaging below U.S. two dollars per round-trip ticket based on a socio-economic
study conducted by the ICAO analyzing air carrier liability limits throughout the
world).
145 SeeDraft Convention, supra note 91, art. 16. Article 16 of the Draft Conven-
tion provides, in part, "[t]he carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of
death or bodily or mental injury of a passenger .... " Id. (emphasis added).
146 The Warsaw Convention sets forth conditions under which international air
carriers can be held liable for injuries to passengers, and does not allow recovery
for purely mental injuries. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 17; Eastern
Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534 (1991) (holding that the French phrase
in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention "lesion corporelle" should be translated
to mean only "bodily injury" and not encompass purely mental injuries therefore
precluding recovery for such injury); see also Lisa M. Fromm, Eastern Airlines v.
Floyd: Airline Passengers Denied Recovery for Emotional Distress Under the Warsaw Con-
vention, 25 AKRON L. REv. 425 (1991).
147 However, under the Draft Convention, the passenger would not be able to
recover from such injury if it "resulted solely from the state of health of the pas-
senger." Draft Convention, supra note 91, art. 16.
148 See International Effort, supra note 57, at 20.
149 As was previously alluded to, the U.S. $75,000 Warsaw System threshold, as
per the Montreal Interim Agreement, was shown to be woefully inadequate when
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latest attempt to rectify the antiquated scheme. While the IATA
Intercarrier Agreement of 1996 has been implemented by some
of the airlines' 50 and does afford significant benefits, the con-
tractual nature of the instrument cannot fully attain the Warsaw
Convention's drafters' dual goals of uniform liability limits and
systematic legal procedures, nor can it serve as a permanent an-
swer to the problem. An international convention, adopted by a
majority of the world's governments, would be the best means
for achieving that which the original Warsaw Convention draft-
ers sought: uniformity and safety. The Draft Convention, as a
new, comprehensive convention and not as a "special contract"
or modification perpetuating the fragmentation that exists as
the Warsaw System, will enjoy the force of international law be-
hind it and will likely be the permanent answer to the seventy-
year-old problem of coping with the inherent complexities of
international, private aviation.
the families of U.S. victims of the 1988 downing of Pan Am Flight 103 in Lock-
erbie, Scotland, were barred from recovering more damages. Lawsuits designed
to prove "willful misconduct" on the part of the airline and surmount the com-
pensation limit inevitably resulted in protracted litigation. See, e.g., In reAir Disas-
ter at Lockerbie, Scot. on Dec. 21, 1988, 928 F.2d 1267, 1279 (2d Cir. 1991); In re
Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scot. on Dec. 21, 1988, 37 F.3d 804, 828 (2d Cir. 1994).
150 As ofJune 1997, 85 air carriers had signed the original 1995 IATA Intercar-
ricr Agreements and 53 had signed a subsequent implementation agreement, yet
only the major U.S. airlines and seventeen non-U.S. airlines have voluntarily im-
plemented the agreement.
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